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Abstract
Does ownership a¤ect the way rms react to corporate taxation? This paper ex-
ploits key features of recent corporate tax reforms in China to shed light on the di¤er-
ential impact of taxation on rms under di¤erent ownership regimes including private,
collectively owned and state owned companies. Employing a di¤erence-in-di¤erence
estimation approach, we nd that the increase in the deductibility of wage costs in
2006 has led to a sizable increase of wages per worker in private rms and an even
larger increase in collective-owned enterprises. In contrast, there is no signicant wage
response in state owned enterprises. The decrease in the statutory tax rate for domestic
rms since 2008 has induced collectivley owned enterprises and private rms to reduce
debt while there is no signicant response SOEs. Our results also suggest that the
2008 reform has reduced tax induced investment round tripping through Hong Kong,
Macao and Taiwan.
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1 Introduction
The transformation of China from a centrally planned economy to a market economy is
one of the most important changes in the world economy in the last three decades. A
key element of this process is the gradual privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs)
and the introduction of a corporate income tax system which raises revenue from both
private and state owned rms. While economic research has devoted a lot of attention to
the privatization process, much less is known about the corporation tax in China. What
makes corporate taxation in China particularly interesting is that the tax is levied on a wide
range of companies including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collectively-owned enterprises,
and private rms that are funded by domestic or foreign shareholders. This feature of the
corporation tax system in China gives us a unique opportunity to shed light on the role of
rm ownership for the impact of corporate taxes on economic behavior.
During the process of economic transformation, China has implemented a series of tax
reforms, including the most recent 2008 corporate tax reform which introduced uniform
taxation of corporate income for all Chinese rms. Before 2008, a dual system was in
place which treated domestic and foreign owned rms di¤erently. The corporate tax rate
for domestic rms was considerably higher than that for foreign owned rms. Moreover,
there was a tax base di¤erence which limits the amount of wages per worker that could be
deducted from the corporate tax base. The limit was only applied to domestic rms while
foreign owned rms could deduct the entire wage cost. As a prelude to the 2008 reform,
the wage deduction ceiling for domestic rms was raised signicantly in 2006. Subsequently,
the corporate tax rate for domestic rm was reduced to the level of the corporate tax rate
applied to foreign rms in 2008. The 2006 base reform and the 2008 rate reform are in the
focus in this paper.1
The 2006 and 2008 corporate tax reform in China provides a unique opportunity to
investigate how rms of di¤erent ownership types react to changes in the tax system. This
issue bears important policy implication because governments often use corporation tax
policies not just to raise revenue but also to encourage business investment and growth,
while many countries particularly those in the developing world operate some form of
mixed economy consisting rms of di¤erent ownership types. In our analysis, we distinguish
ve types of rms in the Chinese economy. First, there are the traditional state-owned
companies (SOEs), typically owned by the provincial or central government. Second, there
are the so called collectively-owned enterprises (COEs). These rms are usually jointly
1Some tax incentives designed to attract foreign direct investment were also abolished in 2008, but the
changes only apply to new foreign direct investment and not to investment made before 2008.
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owned by local governments and municipalities and other public institutions.2 They are also
publicly owned rms but the jurisdictions owning them do not directly receive the taxes they
pay, as will be explained further below. The third group consists of domestic private rms
owned by Chinese citizens or private-sector investors. The rst three groups are all funded
with domestic capital and thus considered domestic-owned rms.
Foreign-owned rms, usually subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies, constitute
the fourth group. The last group consists of rms owned by parent companies or individuals
in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. These companies are often indirectly owned by mainland
Chinese investors, for whomHong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are preferred o¤shore investment
locations. In other words, it was common for Chinese investors to move capital o¤shore and
then bring it back to China disguised as foreign investment. Preferential tax treatment for
FDI was a potential reason for this round trippingof investment.3 The last two groups are
funded with foreign capital and thus foreign-funded rms.
To guide our empirical analysis we rst develop a simple model of rm behaviour in
response to corporation tax, emphasizing the role of ownership. In the model wages are
determined by bargaining between workers and the owners of the rm. Workers di¤er in
their skill levels, and each skill type is represented by a skill-specic worker representation
(trade union). After wages have been determined rm owners set the level of investment
and the nancial structure of the rm.
The objective function of the rm owner depends on who the owner is. While it is
standard to assume that private rms perceive taxes as costs and maximize after-tax prots,
dening the objective function of rms owned by the government is less straightforward.
The existing literature on the taxation of state-owned companies o¤ers di¤erent and partly
opposing views about why these companies are taxed at all and how taxes a¤ect their
behaviour. Huizinga and Nielsen (2001) argue that SOEs di¤er from private companies in
that their activities are not distorted by taxation. If SOEs act in the interest of their owner,
i.e. the government, they will not perceive taxes as costs.4 This in turn implies that the
2There are four sub-national levels in the administrative structure in China: provincial, prefectural,
county and township. There is also an informal level of village government below township.
3In additional to tax advantages, di¤erences in the property rights protection and exchange control
between HMT and mainland China are other important factors for round-tripping investment. Some early
studies estimated that round-tripping accounted for nearly a quarter of foreign inows to China in 1992
(Harrold and Lall, 1993; Lardy, 1995), and the extent of round tripping may have increased since then(World
Bank, 2002).
4We would expect SOEs to be least likely to perceive taxes as costs because these rms are owned by the
central government. The central government collects the corporate tax in China and keeps 60 per cent of the
revenue while the rest is transferred to the provincial budget. A truky enevolent government should perceive
the entire tax revenue as equivalent to a prot distribution. If the central government is only interested in
its own revenue and neglects that of the provinces it should still be the case that SOEs which act in the
interest of their owner perceive only 40 per cent of the tax payments as costs.
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activities of SOEs are not distorted by taxation. In line with this approach some authors
emphasize that many SOE managers in China have bureaucratic titles and are high-ranking
members of the communist Party (Li, 1998).5 SOE managers typically receive evaluations
for political promotions on a three-year cycle, and prior research suggests that such political
promotions are e¤ective incentives for SOE managers to act in the interest of the government
(Bradshaw, Liao and Ma, 2012). According to this view, because such evaluations are done
by bureaucrats, SOE managers are more likely to focus on objectives that best serve those
of the bureaucrats, i.e. the government, and should not perceive taxes as an ultimate cost.
This neutrality viewof SOEs is challenged by Cui (2012), who argues that the Huizinga
and Nielsen (2001) view of SOEs should imply that SOEs are exempt from taxation. How-
ever, most countries including China do tax SOEs. Cui (2012) then suggests that SOEs
are taxed because there is an agency problem between the government and the managers of
SOEs. According to Cui, taxes are an e¢ cient way of extracting money from SOEs. From
this perspective we should expect SOEs to react to taxation as private rms do. In our
theoretical analysis these two contradicting views of how SOEs react to taxes are included
as special cases. Clearly, which of these views is more appropriate is ultimately an empirical
question. To the best of our knowledge the present paper is the rst to address this issue
from an empirical perspective.
The identifying variation that allows us to examine the link between rm ownership
and the e¤ect of corporate taxes is provided by the two tax reforms in 2006 and 2008.
These reforms change the taxation of all domestic rms including SOEs, COEs, and private
rms but not the taxation of foreign rms. We employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erence (D-in-D)
estimation approach to identify the causal e¤ect of tax changes. We focus on the following
two aspects. Firstly, the wage deduction ceiling was uplifted for domestic rms in 2006.
Our theoretical analysis predicts that the increase in the wage deduction ceiling should lead
to an increase in wages for all employees, not just for employees whose wages are above
the deduction ceiling. The e¤ect of taxes on wages is increasing in the bargaining power
of workers, as well as in the weight attributed to taxes as costs as well as in the number
of workers with wages above the deduction ceiling in the rm, i.e. the number of skilled
workers. If taxes are not perceived as costs at all (that is, they are perceived as a perfect
substitute for dividends), there should be no wage response to the increase in the deduction
ceiling. The reason is that, in this case, tax cut does not increase the surplus produced
by the rm. At a more general level the wage change can be interpreted as reecting the
incidence of the corporate tax on wages.
5For example, managers of big state-held telecommunications rms have the same level bureaucratic titles
as the vice Secretary of Industry and Information Techology in China.
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The second aspect we study is the reduction of the tax rate for domestic rms in 2008.
In line with standard theory our model predicts that domestic rms will react to the tax rate
reduction by increasing their investment and by reducing the extent of debt nancing. At
the same time this reform eliminated any tax incentives for Chinese shareholders to round
trip investment through Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Therefore we would expect this
type of investment to decline. Again, if rms do not perceive taxes as costs they should not
react to the tax changes.
In our empirical analysis we nd that there is no signicant response of SOEs to tax
changes. In contrast, we nd strong and signicant responses of both COEs and private
rms. The empirical evidence is consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model
and is robust to a wide range of alternative specications that control for other confounding
factors. More specically, there is no signicant response of wages in SOEs to the increase
in the wage deduction ceiling but there is a sizable increase in the average annual wage per
worker in both COEs and private rms. The preferred estimation results suggest that the
increase in the average wage per worker accounts for around 22 percent of total tax benets
in COEs and around 6 percent of the tax benets in private rms. The wage increase
is signicantly larger in COEs. A possible explanation is that employees may have more
bargaining power in COEs than in private rms. This evidence is further supported by
results in the heterogenous wage response analysis, as there is a stronger wage increase in
COEs and private rms with disproportionately high-skill workers and in those with a trade
union.
Our ndings for the 2008 decrease in the statutory corporate tax rate, which decreases
the incentives to use debt as a tax shield, show a similar pattern. There is no signicant
response of debt ratio in SOEs. In comparison, the debt ratio decreased signicantly in
COEs and private rms. On average, the marginal impact of the CIT rate on the debt-
asset ratio ranges between 0.03 in private rms to 0.06 in COEs. We also nd a strong and
positive e¤ect of the 2008 tax reform on investment undertaken by private rms. The user
cost elasticity is estimated to be around 1 for private investment in China and is consistent
with results of existing studies for other countries. In addition, our ndings suggest the
presence of round-tripping investment under the pre-2008 dual tax system, which declines
after the 2008 tax rate change that eliminated much of the tax incentives for round-tripping
investment.
This paper is related to several strands of empirical literature on the e¤ect of corporation
tax. Firstly, we contribute to studies on the e¤ects of corporation taxes on business invest-
ment.6 Our paper also relates to the literature that focuses on the link between corporate
6The modern literature on the impact of corporate taxation on investment and long-run capital formation
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income tax rates and corporate capital structure.7 Thirdly, there is a growing literature on
tax avoidance by multinational rms.8 We contribute to these three strands of literature
by documenting a causal impact of corporate income taxes on rm investment and capital
structure in China, and by providing evidence on tax motivated investment round-tripping
which can be considered as a form of tax avoidance using multinational corporate structures.
Moreover, our paper relates to the literature on the incidence of the corporate income tax
(CIT), both theoretical and empirical. The modern theory of corporate tax incidence begins
with Harbergers (1962) general equilibrium model of a tax on capital in the corporate sector,
which nds that capital would fully bear the burden. The theoretical literature extends this
basic formulation by introducing multiple sectors (e.g., (Shoven, 1976)), moving to an open
economy (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971; Bradford, 1978; Harberger, 1995), and relaxing the
assumptions of perfect competition (Davidson and Martin, 1985; Arulampalam, Devereux
and Ma¢ ni, 2012; Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch, 2013), and homogenous factors (Diamond and
Spinnewijn, 2011). Our theoretical model allows the extent to which taxes are perceived as
costs to di¤er across private and state owned rms and we show that this may a¤ect the
incidence of the corporate tax on wages.
The recent empirical literature on corporate tax incidence includes a number of studies
which nd that labor shares the burden of corporate income taxes, but results about the
magnitude of the incidence e¤ects di¤er.9 Our ndings conrm the view that there is a
negative e¤ect of corporate income taxes on wages in non-SOEs, and that the e¤ects are
heterogeneous across rms with di¤erent skill compositions of the labor force. In particular,
high and medium-skilled workers, who arguably extract higher rents in collective bargaining,
seem to bear a larger share of the corporate tax burden in China. This result is consistent
with ndings in other studies using data from Germany, UK and United States. Our paper
further contributes to the literature on state and private rms by providing the rst empirical
begins with the pioneering work of Jorgenson (1963). In simplest terms, corporate taxes lower the after-tax
return from investment and reduce the amount of investment and the level of capital stock. Recent empirical
studies that conrm this negative e¤ect of corporation taxes on business investment include Cummins et al.
(1994), Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995), Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999), Edgerton (2010),
Yagan (2013), Bond and Xing (2013), and Zwick and Mahon (2014).
7This literature is reviewed by Auerbach (2002), Graham (2003), and Gordon (2010), among others.
de Mooij (2011) conduct a meta analysis on the tax elasticity of corporate debt and provide a concensus
estimate that a one percentage point higher tax rate increases the debt-asset ratio by between 0.17 and
0.28. An (2012a) and An (2012b) provide empirical evidence on the e¤ect of the 2008 tax reform on rm
investment and capital structure in China, but ignore the important distinction between state and private
rms.
8See e.g. Clausing (2009) and, for a recent meta-study, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013).
9See, for example, Felix and James R. Hines (2009), Arulampalam, Devereux and Ma¢ ni (2012), Liu and
Altshuler (2013), Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch (2013), and Dwenger, Rattenhuber and Steiner (2013). Also see
Clausing (2013) for a critical discussion on this topic. She argues that, at least in macro data, evidence of
labor bearing part of the corporate income tax is weak.
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comparison of their response to corporate taxation.10
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the institutional
background. In section three we develop a simple model of wage setting and investment in
SOEs and derive testable hypotheses for the impact of tax changes on wages and other
behavioural responses. In section 4 we present the data and discuss some summary statistics
and stylized facts on SOEs in China. Section 5 and 6 include the empirical analysis for the
2006 and 2008 tax changes, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
In this section we rst provide an overview over the di¤erent types of rm ownership in
China. Next we briey discuss the privatization of SOEs in China during the opening up
process and the implications for wage setting institutions. We then describe the current
corporation tax system in China and how the recent tax reform brought di¤erential changes
in the tax treatment of rms with di¤erent ownership types.
2.1 Ownership Structure of Chinese Firms
Firms in China are classied by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce as
domestic or foreign funded.11 As discussed in the introduction, domestic funded rms in-
clude SOEs, COEs, and private rms. SOEs established by the central, provincial or local
government have senior managers and other supervisory o¢ cials as civil servants from the
government. Centrally-owned SOEs are directly managed by the State-owned Assets Super-
vision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and other central government ministries
and commissions.12 Provincial and local SOEs are controlled by the sub-national govern-
ments and managed by the provincial and local SASACs. By the end of 2013, there were
about 52,000 central SOEs and 104,000 regional SOEs in China, with the latter group in-
cluding 42,000 provincial, 1,600 municipal, and 4,500 county SOEs. Total assets of SOEs is
around 1,041 trillion RMB (approx. £ 104,000 billion), producing a total output of around
471,000 billion RMB (£ 47,100 billion) which accounts for nearly 6 percent of GDP in 2013.
Relaxing the denition of SOE from wholly state funded to those who are majority state
10The literature on state and private rms is survey in Megginson and Netter (2001). See Chen et al.
(2015) for a recent empirical analysis on the di¤erence between state and private rms in their internal
capital allocation decisions.
11Activities of rms incorporated in China are governed by the Corporate Regulation of the Peoples
Republic of China on the Management of Registration of Enterprises.
12The SASAC was created by the State Council in March 2003 via Decree 378 (2003) and holds the shares
of SOEs that were previously held by the state.
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funded, there are about 278,479 SOEs in China in 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013).
Domestically funded rms also include COEs, which are owned either by employees of
the rm, a group of community members such as all the residents in an administrative
jurisdiction, or by township and village governments. Following a Redening the Property
Rights reform launched by the government in the early 1990s, collective enterprises have
come under closer control of the government as their assets became deemed to be owned
by the state (unless otherwise nanced by borrowing or self-funding). Unlike collective
enterprises, private enterprises are owned by private individuals who hire workers for prot-
making activities. They account for 96.9% of total domestic enterprises in China.
A rm is dened as foreign owned if foreign rms hold 25% or more of its equity shares.
By denition, foreign-owned rms include joint ventures between state-owned enterprises and
foreign investors, as long as the foreign share is larger than 25%. Foreign-owned rms are
further classied into two types: those owned by rms in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan
(HMT) which share a distinctive economic and political proximity with the mainland of
China, and those owned by foreign rms outside these three locations. In 2012, there were
about 101,518 HMT rms and 109,103 other foreign-owned rms in China (National Bureau
of Statistics, 2013).
2.2 Privatization and Wage Setting System in SOEs
Historically there was basically no labor market in China. All rms were owned by the
state, while output, jobs and total wage bill in the SOEs were set by the central plan.
Within a given SOE, wages were determined according to a national system of grades, scales
and seniority. Promotion and wage increases were based on age and experience within
the work unit. Because priority was given to capital accumulation to encourage industrial
development, wages were set at a very low level.13
A state-owned enterprise restructuring program was initiated in 1997 in order to tackle
large and unsustainable nancial losses of SOEs, marking the end of guaranteed employment
and benets for Chinas urban workers. The theme of the reform was to grasp the large
13Regarding the wage distribution within SOEs, there was dramatic wage compression which implied
substantial subsidies to the least skilled workers. For example, workers were classied into eight skills, and
the ratio of the highest to the lowest wage was only 3.15. Such a compensation structure remained in the
state sector well into the 1990s during the reform era in China (Gordon and Li, 1999). A oating total
wage system was implemented in 1984 to replace the centrally xed total wage quota system as part of a
larger initiative to separate company ownership and management by introducing a contract responsibility
system. The oating wage system linked the total wage bill and prot remittances to the government of an
enterprise to its economic performance in the previous three years. While the pay scale was still primarily
based on pay rank and occupation, wage payments for individual workers became composed of two parts:
a xed basic pay and a oating bonus. The oating system related the enterprises total wage bill to its
protability, allowing rms to retain part of their prots for workersbonus and the total wage bill.
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and release the small: most small and unproductive SOEs were privatized or sold o¤ at the
municipal and county level, while some of the larger SOEs were restructured through mergers,
incorporation, and public listing through initial public o¤erings (Cao, Qian and Weingast,
1999). As part of this initiative, the number of SOEs was reduced by 74% while around 28
million SOE workers were made redundant, accounting for half of the SOE workforce (Xia
et al., 2013).
A key goal of the SOE reform was to transform the remaining SOEs into modern market-
oriented enterprises. The state also gave more autonomy to the managers of the incorporated
SOEs. The reform and restructuring of SOEs was followed by soaring wages and bonuses
in the SOE sector. Even in the period of mass retrenchment, there was a pay rise for those
SOE workers who remained employed (see, for example, Appleton, Song and Xia (2005)
and Bai, Lu and Tao (2006)). To address this issue, the SASAC was established in June of
2003 to oversee all SOEs in China. A labor contract system was introduced to all central
SOEs, by which, in each year, the SASAC negotiates with each of the SOEs over the base
amount of wages and salaries for next year.14 Two general principles were to guide wage
increases in SOEs: the growth rate of total wages should be lower than the growth rate of
protability, and the growth rate of the average wage should be lower that of productivity.
The total amount of wages and salaries in a SOE is also tied to its protability, depending
on the extent to which the SOE meets its key performance indicators including sales and
prot targets. The determination of the wage structure remains a matter of decision making
within the SOE sector.
2.3 Evolution of Corporation Tax in China
The current corporate tax system in China, which is e¤ective since January 1, 2008, sets
the same basic tax rules for all companies in China. The current statutory tax rate is 25%,
and all enterprises are treated equally in regard of income tax including tax preferential
treatments.15
Prior to the uniform corporate tax system, domestic and foreign enterprises were taxed
under the same headline rate of 33%. The e¤ective tax rate for foreign enterprises, however,
was much lower, due to a combination of reduced statutory tax rates, extended tax holidays,
and generous tax deductions as listed in column (3) of Table 1. The policy justication
14The regional and provincial SASAC branch will negotiate with each of the subnationally controlled SOEs
at the corresponding administrative level.
15The uniform tax system replaced a dual enterprise tax which had been in e¤ect for more than 30
years, with the Corporate Income Tax Law for Companies with Foreign Investment and Foreign Companies
governing taxation of foreign enterprises and Temporary Rules on Corporate Income Tax governing taxation
of domestic enterprises.
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which was given for the preferential tax treatment was to attract foreign direct investment
with a low tax burden.
Having remained in place for about 30 years, this preferential tax treatment for foreign-
funded companies was gradually removed by the 2006 base reform and the more compre-
hensive 2008 rate reform. However, in the rst years after 2008 the e¤ective taxation for
foreign rms remained unchanged because the tax privileges were phased out gradually, as
will be explained in greater detail below.
Corporation income tax (CIT) is the second largest source of tax revenue in China,
representing 16.1% of total government revenue in 2011 (see Figure A.1).16 Over the last
decade CIT revenue has tended to grow much faster than national income. For example, CIT
revenue increased at an average annual rate of 24.5% during 2003-2011. CIT revenue was
equal to 2% of GDP in 2003 and amounted to 3.5% of GDP in 2011. The central government
sets the legislation governing taxation including corporate income taxation. Local authorities
have no autonomy in the area of taxation (Wang and Herd, 2013).
China has a dual system of tax administration and collection. The State Administration
of Taxation (SAT) and its local o¢ ces collect corporation taxes of central SOEs, and the
provincial governments have their own institutions to collect corporation tax revenues from
regional SOEs, COEs and private rms.17 Tax revenues collected at the sub-national level are
then transferred to the central government and the total revenue of corporation tax is shared
between the central and local governments following a 60%-40% split.18 As discussed inWang
and Herd (2013), tax sharing between government levels follows the criterion of individual
proportionality so that the revenue share of each sub-central government is strictly related
to tax revenue generated on its own territory. 19
2.3.1 Phase 1: Elimination of Regional Tax Refund to SOEs in 2002
Another tax change that was relevant for our empirical analysis is the elimination of regional
tax refund in 2002, a period during which many domestic enterprises were also taxed at a
16In comparison, corporate tax revenue has remained relatively stable and accounts for approximately 10%
of annual tax revenue in the UK over the last decade.
17For corporate taxes, the entire prot of a company operating across several provinces is allocated to the
province where the company has its headquater.
18Each level of sub-national government then shares their corporate tax revenue with the lower-level
government. In 2009, the share of corporate income tax allocated to sub-national governments is as follows:
37.8% to provincial, 31.1 to prefecture, 23% to county, and 8.1% to township government.
19revenue sharing is governed be the three principles of risk sharing, unconditionally, and formula stabil-
ity.Risk sharing implies that the amount of revenue allocated to the sub-central level is strictly related to
the total tax intake. Un-conditionality implies that the sub-central government is free to use the allocated
tax revenue. Formula stability implies that the revenue shares of the central and sub-central governments
are pre-determined and cannot be changed during the period of the agreement (Wang and Herd, 2013).
10
low rate similar to their foreign counterparts. Before 2000, it was common for regional
governments in China to engage in tax competition to boost investment and employment
by giving above-scale domestic rms part of their tax receipts collected. The rate of tax
refund was usually 18%, which aligned the e¤ective tax rate for domestic rms to be the
same as the 15 percent rate for foreign funded rms. This was to level the playing eld
between major domestic and foreign rms at the expense of tax revenues. Starting from
2000, such practice was explicitly prohibited by the central government, and the corporation
tax revenue collection authority was changed from regional administration of taxes to state
administration of taxes. By 2002, both listed and unlisted domestic rms no longer received
preferential tax treatment in the form of partial tax refunds. Accounting for these changes
in the tax reform, the sample period that we consider in the empirical analysis runs from
2003 to 2009.
2.3.2 Phase 2: Increase in the Wage Deduction Ceiling in 2006
Prior to the 2008 tax reform, domestic rms could only deduct wage bills up to a limit. The
wage deduction limit was 800 RMB per month for each worker between January 1, 1999 and
June 30, 2006, and was doubled to 1,600 RMB from July 1, 2006 to December 31, 2008.20
Employee benets including union fees, training fees and social security contributions were
deductible up to a maximum of 2%, 14% and 1.5% of the total wage. In contrast, foreign-
funded enterprises could fully deduct wages and employee benets from the corporate tax
base. The deduction limit for domestic enterprises was completely abolished since January 1,
2008 so that wage expenses became fully deductible in all rms regardless of their ownership
type. Details of these two reforms are also summarized in column (4) of Table 1.
2.3.3 Phase 3: Unication of Enterprise Income Tax in 2008
The Enterprise Income Tax Law was enacted in March 16, 2007 and took e¤ect beginning
January 1, 2008 for all rms in China. Under the new tax law, companies of all ownership
types are subject to a uniform income tax rate of 25%. In particular, there is a signicant
reduction in the statutory tax rate for domestic enterprises from 33% to 25%.
The new tax law provides a ve-year transition period for foreign-funded enterprises.
The transition period starts from the date of enactment for those rms established before
March 16, 2007, which were entitled to the lower income tax rate under the old system. The
corporate income tax rate of these enterprises will gradually increase to 18%, 20%, 22%, 24%,
20The 2006 increase in the deduction ceiling also eliminated the discretionary increase in the ceiling by
20% at the provincial level, upon joint approval of the Ministry of Finance and SAT.
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and 25% within the next ve years of the transition period. For those enterprises which were
enjoying tax holidays in the form of two-year tax exemptions, such tax holidays continued
to be e¤ective. For those enterprises which were entitled to the tax holiday but had not
yet started claiming the tax holidays because of losses, such tax holidays were deemed to
commence in 2008. Summarizing, for new or loss-making foreign enterprises, the two-year
tax holiday starts immediately in 2008 instead of starting in the rst year when the foreign
enterprise becomes protable. Because of the transition period, there is no immediate tax
change for most foreign enterprises following the introduction of the 2008 uniform tax law.
3 Theoretical Framework
What are the economic e¤ects we should expect from the changes in the corporate tax
system in China? In this section we develop a stylized model of rm behavior where wage
setting as well as employment and investment decisions are the result of bargaining between
di¤erent groups of employees and rm owners. Following Huizinga and Nielsen (2001), we
assume that rm owners di¤er in the degree to which they see corporate income taxes as
costs, depending on whether or not the owner, which may be the government, fully or partly
receives the tax revenue generated by the rm.
3.1 The Model
Consider a rm with two types of workers, low skilled and high skilled. Firm is prot before
taxes is given by
Pi = Fi(L
1
i ; L
2
i ; Ki)  w1iL1i   w2iL2i   [rdi d+ rei (1  d) + i(d)]Ki;
where wki , L
k
i (k = 1; 2), Ki and ri denote wages, employment levels, the rms capital and
the non-tax cost of capital, respectively; ri is given by
ri = r
d
i di + r
e
i (1  di) + i(di);
where 0  di  1 is the share of debt nancing of the rms capital, rdi is the interest on
debt, rei is the minimum rate of return required by the rms equity investors, and i(di)
is a nontax cost of debt nancing, which may be interpreted, for instance, as representing
agency costs depending on the capital structure of a rm. We assume that i(di) is strictly
convex in di, with 0i(d
0
i ) = 0; 
00
i (d
0
i ) > 0; and 0 < d
0
i < 1:
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21This is a standard way of modelling the nontax costs and benets of changes in the capital structure.
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Denote the ceiling for wage deductions per worker by w and assume that the ceiling is
binding for workers of type 2 (the high skilled) but not for workers of type 1, i.e. w1i < w <
w2i . Since interest payment on debt is deductible from the prot tax base, the amount of
corporate income tax the rm has to pay is given by
Ti = t[Fi(L
1
i ; L
2
i ; Ki)  w1iL1i   wL2i   [rdi di + i(di) + ]Ki];
where t is the statutory tax rate and  is a parameter representing depreciation deductions.
Assume further that rm owner j attributes a weight to tax payments denoted by j,
with j 2 [0; 1]. For instance, a private rm owner will usually set a weight  = 1, so that
taxes would be considered as any other type of cost. In contrast, if the rm is owned by a
government which receives the tax payment as income, the government should be indi¤erent
between a prot distribution and a corporate income tax payment. In this case, j = 0.
There could also be intermediate cases. For instance, in many federal states corporate income
tax revenue is shared between regional or local governments and the central government. In
China, the sharing ratio of corporate tax revenue is 60% versus 40% between the central
and provincial government, as explained in section 2.3.22 Under this sharing scheme, if the
local government receives a share s of the corporate income tax revenue generated by a rm
it owns, the cost weight attributed to taxes should be j = 1   s. Incorporating all these
possible scenarios, the objective function of a rm owner of type j owning rm i is given by
Zji = Pi   jTi: (1)
3.2 Firm Behavior and Wage Setting
Wemodel rm behavior and wage setting as follows. Decisions about employment, nancing,
investment and wages are taken in two stages. At stage 1 workers and rms bargain over
wages and employment. At stage 2 the rm sets its nancial structure di and the capital
stock Ki to maximize prots.
We start by considering stage 2. The rm maximizes (1) over di and Ki. The rst order
conditions are given by
@Fi(L
1
i ; L
2
i ; K

i )
Ki
= i(d

i ) (2)
0i(d

i ) =
rei
(1  jt)
  rdi (3)
22No. 26 [2003] of the State Council (November 13, 2003): Notice of the State Council on Clarifying the
Proportion for the Central Government and the Local Government to Share the Income from Income Taxes.
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where
i(d

i ) =
rei (1  di ) + (rdi di + i(di ))(1  jt)  t
(1  jt)
is the cost of capital including taxes, given the rms optimal nancing structure di .
Consider next stage 1, where worker rm bargaining takes place. The two groups of
workers and the rm owner simultaneously bargain over wages wki and employment levels
Lki , k = 1; 2. Reservation wages for workers are given by b
k; k = 1; 2. Workers maximize
their rent, which is given by (wki   bk)Lki = pkiLki , where pki is the wage premium for workers
of type k . The rm owners reservation prot is normalized to zero. The outcome of the
bargaining process is given by
pki ; L
k
i = argmax
pki ;L
k
i

ij;
where

ij = k ln p
k
iL
k
i + (1  k) lnZij: (4)
The variable k denotes relative bargaining power of the two groups of workers. The rst
order conditions for the solution of the bargaining problem can be rearranged to yield the
following results for employment:
@Fi(L
1
i ; L
2
i ; K

i )
L1i
= b1; (5)
@Fi(L
1
i ; L
2
i ; K

i )
L2i
=
b2   jtw
(1  jt)
. (6)
The ceiling for wage deductions leads to a distortion of high skilled (type 2) employment, as
one might expect.
For the two wage premia we get:
w1i   b1 = p1i =
1(1  2)
(1  12)

i
L1(1  jt)

(7)
w2i   b2 = p2i =
2(1  1)
(1  12)

i
L2

(8)
where
i = Fi(L
1
i ; L
2
i ; Ki)(1  jt)  b1L1i (1  jt)  (b22   jtw)L2i
 [(rdi d+ i(d) + )(1  jt) + rei (1  d)]Ki;
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is the surplus after taxes generated by the rm. Equations (2), (3),(5),(6),(7) and (8)
implicitly dene the variables Ki ; d

i ; L
1
i ; L
2
i ; w
1
i w
2
i as functions of the tax rate t, the
deduction ceiling w, the weight that rm owner j attributes to tax payments j, and of
other parameters in the model.
Our empirical analysis focuses on (i) the impact of the change in the deduction ceiling
w on wages in the 2006 reform, and (ii) the impact of the 2008 change in the corporate tax
rate on investment and leverage.
Consider rst the change in the deduction ceiling. Di¤erentiating (7) and (8) and using
equations (2), (3),(5),(6) yields:
dp1i L1 + p
1
i dL1 =
1(1  2)
(1  12)
jtL
2
i
(1  jt)
dw  0 (9)
dp2i L1 + p
2
i dL2 =
2(1  1)
(1  12)
jtL
2
i dw  0 (10)
The rents accruing to both groups of workers increase if the wage deduction ceiling in-
creases. This implies that, for given levels of employment, both wages increase if w increases.
This e¤ect is stronger, the higher the bargaining power of the workers, the more tax pay-
ments are perceived as costs and the larger the number of type 2 workers for whom the
deduction ceiling will be binding. We may thus state the following:
Result 1: If 1; 2; j > 0 wages of all workers will increase in response to an increase in
the deduction ceiling, given the levels of Lki and Ki. The e¤ect is increasing in the bargaining
power of the skill group, the weight attributed to tax costs as well as the number of skilled
workers in the rm.
What is the impact of a tax rate change on investment and debt nancing? Note that
equation (2) implicitly denes Ki = K

i (t; j; w; r
e
i ; r
d
i ; L
1
i ; L
2
i ), with
@Ki
@t
=
jr
e
i ((1 di ) )
(1 jt)2 .
Equation (3) denes di = d

i (t; j; r
e
i ; r
d
i ) with
@di
@t
=
jr
e
i
(1 jt)2  0. The result that
@Ki
@t
>
0 requires  < rei (1   di ) is standard in the literature and reects that accelerated tax
depreciation may lead to the taxation paradox, where higher tax rates increase investment
because they increase the value of depreciation allowances. Most tax systems, however,
include more limited depreciation allowances so that higher taxes reduce investment. These
ndings are summarised as
Result 2: If j > 0 and rei ((1   di )    > 0, and for given levels of employment, an
increase (decrease) in the corporate tax rate reduces (increases) investment Ki , and
Result 3: If j > 0, an increase (decrease) in the corporate tax rate increases (reduces)
debt nancing di .
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3.3 Implications for the Empirical Analysis
What do results 1-3 imply for our empirical analysis? Consider rst result 1, which is related
to the 2006 reform. The model predicts that the reaction of wages to changes in the deduction
ceiling depends on three factors: (1) the distribution of bargaining power in the wage setting
process, (2) the weight owners/managers attribute to taxes as costs, and (3) the share of
workers with wages above the deduction ceiling. Our data does include some information on
di¤erences in average skill and wage levels across rms but relative worker bargaining power
and the weights attributed to taxes as costs are unobservable.
Our model nevertheless o¤ers some guidance for the empirical analysis. Firstly, it high-
lights the di¤erence in views between Huizinga and Nielsen (2001) and Cui (2012). Corporate
tax revenue in China rst goes to the central government. If there are rms that do not
perceive taxes as costs they are more likely to be those owned by the central government
(the SOEs and particularly the central SOEs) rather than the COEs since the latter are
owned by local governments. If this is the case, wage increase after the 2006 reform should
be stronger in COEs than in SOEs. If we observe no such di¤erence and both types of
rms increase wages in response to the higher wage ceiling, this would support Cui (2012)s
claim that SOEs are run by managers who do perceive taxes paid to their owner, the central
government, as a cost.23
The model also draws attention to the fact that di¤erent wage reactions may reect
di¤erences in the distribution of bargaining power in wage negotiations. Here the di¤erence
between state-owned (both SOE and COE) rms, on the one hand, and private rms on the
other hand may play a role. Employees in state-owned rms are more likely to have strong
bargaining power than in private rms because public owners may be less focused on prots
than private owners. In addition, domestic private rms are often relatively small and have
a less skilled workforce. One would expect that worker bargaining power plays a smaller role
because workers can more easily be replaced.
What does our theoretical analysis have to say about the corporate tax changes that
came into force in 2008? For the 2008 tax reform the reduction in the statutory tax rate for
domestic rms was the most important element. Equations (7) and (8) show that we should
again observe a wage e¤ect in the rms beneting from the tax cut.24 But a change in the
headline corporate tax rate also changes incentives for corporate investment and nancing
decisions. Results 2 and 3 predict that the decline in the corporate tax rate for domestic
23An alternative explanation would be that managers of SOEs perceive the increase in the deduction ceiling
as a political signal to raise wages. They might react to this signal irrespective of the nancial incentives
created by the reform. Yet another explanation would be that fairness norms require rms to adjust wages.
24Unfortunately our data only include the wage variable up to 2007 so we are unable to test empirically
the wage response following the 2008 reform.
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rms will increase investment and reduce debt nancing in these rms, provided that the
owners perceive taxes as costs. We bring these predictions to empirical tests in the following
sections.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
4.1 Data set
We use the rm-level Annual Survey of Industrial Firms dataset conducted by the National
Bureau of Statistics of China. This dataset contains detailed accounting and ownership
information on all SOEs in China and all the non-SOEs with annual sales over RMB 5
million (approx. £ 500,000). It covers rms in 41 broad industry sectors including mining,
manufacturing, and electricity and utility. In 2007, rms in the data account for 47.4% of
total industrial value-added and 26.8% of total urban employment in China.
We take the following steps to create a clean sample for the analysis. We rst exclude
rms in the mining, electricity and utility sector and use rms in the 31 two-digit industry
sectors of manufacturing, wholesale and retailing. We exclude all rms with zero or negative
sales, outputs, total assets, xed assets, employment, wages, and total paid-in capital. We
further exclude rms with any observations taking negative values in: total asset minus
net xed asset, accumulated depreciation minus current-year depreciation, and total paid-
in capital minus paid-in capital from each type of investors. We check the consistency of
rm identier and exclude all rms reporting di¤erent 2-digit industry sector and year of
incorporation in the sample period. In addition, we exclude observations with fewer than 10
employees since these rms are less likely to use credible accounting system. To minimize
the inuence of outliers on the regression analysis, we winsorize the key variables including
wage bill, employment and annual wage bill per worker at the top and bottom 1 percentile
of its distribution in each year.
We use the full sample dataset following the above data cleaning procedure to present
some stylized facts about SOEs. We use a smaller, unbalanced dataset which includes rms
that exist in the sample at least two years before and one year after the relevant policy
reform in the regression analysis. Both datasets range between 2003 and 2009 to minimize
the potential impact of partial tax refunds to domestic rms in identifying the tax e¤ect of
interest. All monetary variables are deated to 2006 prices.
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4.2 Key variables
To understand the e¤ect of the 2006 policy reform on wages, we compute the annual average
company wage as costs of employees divided by the total number of employees.25 We focus
on two outcome variables to understand the impact of corporation tax on the investment and
nancial decisions of rms. Specically, we use the debt-asset ratio to measure the extent
of rm borrowing, which is dened as total debt relative to total assets for each rm-year
observation. As in most other countries, rms in China can deduct interest expenses from
the corporate tax base, but not equity returns. We use the log of total xed assets to measure
the extent of investment.
In 2004, China conducted its rst nationwide economic census. As a result, the 2004
data includes additional important information on the number of workers by education levels
(including those with postgraduate, college graduate, associate degree, high school diploma,
and below high school education, respectively). We use this information to distinguish
between enterprises that mainly employ low-skilled workers and those that mainly employ
high-skilled workers. In addition, the 2004 data reports whether the enterprise has an union
and the corresponding number of workers as union members.
Following discussions in section 2.1, we identify a companys ownership type based on the
registration type and the relative amount of paid-in capital. Every Chinese rm is registered
as a domestic enterprise in the form of SOE, COE, or private enterprise, or as a foreign-
funded enterprise in the form of a HMT enterprise or other foreign investment enterprise
(FIE).
We complement ownership registration with additional information on the amount of
paid-in capital in each rm. Specically, we identify the major shareholder type of a rm by
comparing the amount of total paid-in capital with that of each paid-in capital type including
state capital, collective capital, legal-person capital, individual capital, HMT capital and
foreign capital. The Law of the Peoples Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint
Ventures requires the proportion of the capital contributed by the foreign investor(s) to be at
least 25% of the equity share in the joint ventures are HMT/foreign venturers. Following this
requirement, we identify an enterprise as HMT/foreign if the proportion of foreign paid-in
capital is more than 25% of the total paid-in capital, or the largest share of the total paid-in
capital if none of the other types of investors have a majority share. Following this approach,
we are also able to identify rms that changed ownership during the sample period, which
represents quite a small share of the full sample as shown in Table A.1.
25The annual company wage is reported in the prot and loss account as total wage payment to employees
during the nancial year including wage and salaries, bonus and job-related allowances. It does not include
benets in kind such as medical insurance, housing allowance and other welfare benets.
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4.3 Summary Statistics: some stylized facts about SOEs
4.3.1 Decrease in numbers
Figure 1 reports the key sample characteristics by ownership type between 2003 and 2009.
Panel (a) shows that the number of rms has increased substantially over the last decade.
This is mainly because more non-SOEs entered the sample by meeting the nominal 5 million
RMB criterion as a result of rapid expansion of the economy. The rapid expansion in the
domestic private sector outweighs the decrease in the number of rms in the state sector,
suggesting that the increase in the number of private companies is not driven by privatization
of SOEs. Between 2003 and 2009, the share of SOEs decreased from 20 percent to less than 2
percent, and the share of COEs decreased from 19 percent to around 3 percent. In contrast,
the share of domestic privately owned rms increased from 41 to 78 percent, while the share
of foreign-funded rms (including HMTs) remains stable at around 18%. Note that there
is a sharp increase in the number of private domestic rms in 2005, which is documented
and discussed in other studies that use the same database for analysis.26 This is because a
more comprehensive Industrial Census was conducted in 2004 and identied a large number
of rms that were previously left out of the annual survey due to imperfect business registry.
As a result, more non-SOEs has been included in the annual survey since then.
4.3.2 Large operation scale
Panels (b)-(d) of gure 1 show that on average, SOEs operate on a much larger scale than
rms of other ownership types as measured by total assets, total industrial sales, and the
number of employment. For example, the average of total assets in SOEs is 16 times larger
than in private rms and 5 times larger than in foreign rms in 2009. On average, an SOE
has 6.5 times more sales and employs 3 times more workers than a private rm, and has 2.3
times more sales and employs 1.6 times more workers than a foreign rm. As a consequence,
total assets per worker in an average SOE is 5.4 times more than in a private rm and 3.1
times more than in a foreign rm.
SOEs also demonstrate strong growth over the sample period, partly due to the fact that
the state has allocated unrivaled amounts of resources to maintain the economic dominance
of a relatively small number of SOEs. For example, on average total real assets per worker
in SOEs more than doubled from 322.89 to 729.8 million RMB during 2003-2009, while the
concurrent increase in total assets per worker in private and foreign rms is 1.60 and 1.2
times, respectively.
26For example, see Lu and Tao (2009), and Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012).
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4.3.3 Low protability and tax payment
There is sharp contrast between the large operation scale with the small number of protable
SOEs in panel (a) of gure 2. The share of protable SOEs, measured by the number of
SOEs with positive operating prots is around 45% in 2003 and is much lower than the 80%
of protable rms in the private sector and 70% of protable foreign-funded rms. While
the gap has been closing due to the continuous increase in the number of protable SOEs,
the share of protable SOEs is still the lowest toward the end of the sample period. In
other words, a substantial percentage of SOEs run at a loss, implying that they are either
subsidized by the government or by the state-owned banking system.
Despite the large size of SOEs, they are on average slightly less protable. Focusing on
the protable rms, it is interesting to note in panel (c) that foreign funded rms and HMTs
are slightly more protable than their domestic counterparts. Within the domestic group
the protability of private rms and COEs is closely related and remains slightly higher than
that of SOEs by the end of 2009.
Finally, panel (d) of gure 2 compares the mean average tax rate (ATR)calculated as
the corporate income tax payment relative to earnings before tax (EBT)across ownership
types. Three observations are worth noting. First, the mean ATR is considerably lower
than the corresponding statutory rate across all ownership types, reecting the generosity
of various tax deductions and credits that are available to Chinese rms. For example, the
pre-2008 statutory tax rate for domestic rms was 33 percent and is almost twice their mean
ATR. Second, there are systematic di¤erences in the average ATR across di¤erent ownership
types. To check the relation between total corporation tax payments and earnings before
taxes, we regress the total corporation tax paid in rm i at year t (CTit) against the rm-
level operating prot (Pr ofitit) by ownership types, while controlling for depreciation, and
interest expenses (IntExpit) :
CTit = 0 + 1 Pr ofitit + 2Depreciationit + 3IntExpit + i + t + uit; (11)
where i and t are a full set of rm and year xed e¤ects. In equation (11), 1 is a measure of
the average tax rate by ownership, while 2 and 3 captures the overall e¤ect of depreciation
allowances and interest expenses on total tax payment, respectively. Table 2 summarizes the
ndings. The estimated average tax rate b1 is positive and highly signicant in all ownership
types, and is considerably higher in SOEs and private rms.
Compared to domestic rms, the mean ATR for foreign-funded rms is signicantly lower
due to the pre-2008 preferential tax treatment for foreign investment. The mean ATR for
domestic and foreign rms also demonstrate di¤erent trends over time, with the former
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continuing to decrease toward to the end of the time period. In contrast, while remaining
low in levels, the mean ATR for foreign-funded rms started to increase slightly from 2008.
As of 2009, the mean ATR across the di¤erent ownership types started to converge in levels,
at least among rms with positive book prots.
5 Wage Responses to the 2006 Reform
5.1 Estimation Approach
Following the theoretical considerations in Section 2, we estimate an empirical model of the
following form
logwit = 0 + 1SOEi + 2SOEi  Post2006;t + 3COEi + 4COEi  Post2006;t (12)
+5privatei + 6privatei  Post2006;t + XXit + i + t + it;
where wit represents the annual average company wage for rm i at time t. Since the
distribution of wi is considerably skewed, we employ a logarithmic transformation of the
level of average wage rate as the dependent variable. The variables SOEi/COEi/privatei is a
dummy indicator of ownership type which takes value of 1 if the considered rm is a domestic
SOE/COE/private rm and 0 otherwise, respectively. Note that the excluded ownership type
is foreign-funded rms including HMTs and other FIEs. The variable Post2006;t is a dummy
indicator that takes a value of 1 from 2006 onwards. The key variables of interest are the
three interaction terms between the ownership indicators SOEi/COEi/privatei and the post-
reform indicator Post2006;t. If workers share part of the higher after-tax prot due to more
generous tax deductions, we would expect a positive coe¢ cient for each of the interaction
term having controlled for a full set of rm xed e¤ects i and year xed e¤ects t. More
importantly, following Result 1 in the theoretical section, we expect the coe¢ cients of the
three interaction terms (2, 4 and 6) to be potentially di¤erent. Some of the regression
specications further control for a set of time-varying rm characteristics included in the
vector Xit. Precisely, we control for the size of the rm by including the enterprises total
sales, sales growth rate, and capital stock proxied by total asset. In some of the specications
we also control for employment which may be a¤ected by the change in the tax base. We
control for rm age to acknowledge that young rms entering a market may face di¤erent
wage costs. In addition, to better control for growth at the industry level, we include a full
set of industry-specic time trends that capture industry-level technological change over and
above the common macroeconomic trends. Finally, it depicts the error term.
21
5.2 Graphical Evidence
Figure 3 shows the annual average company wage across the di¤erent ownership types around
the 2006 policy change. There is a discernible wage premium in foreign-funded rms, while
the average wage payment per worker continues to increase for all ownership types between
2004 and 2007. While changes in the average company wage in the domestic and foreign
rms tracks one another closely before the reform, there is a clear divergence after 2006
driven by a notable increase in the wage payment by SOEs and COEs. The increase in the
wage payment in domestic private rms is less signicant and continues to move similarly to
the average wage payment in foreign-funded rms after the reform. These patterns suggest
that the 2006 increase in the wage deduction threshold may have some positive impact on
workerswage in domestic rms and particularly, in SOEs and COEs. The regression analysis
in the next section aims to disentangle the causal e¤ect of tax changes on wages from the
e¤ects of various potential confounding factors.
5.3 Basic Results
Table 3 presents regression results using a set of specications based on equation (12) and
augmented in various ways as described below. All regressions include a full set of rm and
year xed e¤ects. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered at the rm
level are shown in brackets below the coe¢ cient estimates.
The regression in column (1) follows the baseline specication in equation (12) without
including any additional control variables. On average, domestic rms pay a lower wage
compared to their foreign-funded peers as indicated by the negative coe¢ cients on the SOE,
COE and private dummy indicators. The wage gap between SOEs and foreign-funded
rms is statistically insignicant, though. The estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction term
SOE  Post2006 is positive and marginally signicant at the 10% level while the estimated
coe¢ cients of the other two interaction terms COE  Post2006 and private  Post2006 are
positive and highly signicant at the 1% level.
Quantitatively, the strong e¤ect of changes in the tax base on annual average company
wages in domestic COEs and private rms is robust to excluding observations in 2006 and
using 2007 as the post-reform year in column (2), which allows for some adjustment lags in
the wage setting process, and to adding rm-level control variables of log sales in column
(3), employment in column (4) and sales growth rate and log xed assets in column (5). The
e¤ect of tax on annual company wage in SOEs becomes insignicant once controlling for
rm size proxied by log sales. Column (6) further includes rm age and sector-specic time
trend as additional controls. Column (7) follows the same specication in column (6) using
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a smaller sample with no companies switching ownership types. The basic ndings remain
quantitatively unchanged.
The di¤erences across specications can be interpreted in the light of the approach sug-
gested by Arulampalam, Devereux and Ma¢ ni (2012). Without including any controls, the
identied tax e¤ect on wages in specications (1) and (2) may be seen as the total incidence
of corporate income taxes including the e¤ect of taxes on wages through the scale of produc-
tion and investment. In comparison, specications that control for the scale of production
and investment would identify the direct incidence of corporate income taxes through the
collective bargaining channel. Note that, as laid out in the theoretical discussion, work-
ers and rm owners can bargain over both wages and employment. To check whether the
wage response is entirely driven by bargaining over employment, we compare the identied
tax e¤ects in specications (3) and (4). The size of the wage response decreases slightly
when controlling for employment, but nevertheless remains positive and highly signicant
for COEs and private domestic rms.
Three observations are worth noting in Table 3. First, there is no signicant wage increase
in SOEs in response to the 2006 tax base reform, as indicated by the insignicant estimated
coe¢ cient on the interaction term SOE  Post2006 in specications (3)-(6). We further
examine whether wages responded di¤erently in wholly-owned SOEs and majority-owned
SOEs and nd that there is no signicant tax e¤ect on wages in either SOE type.
Second, both COEs and private rms responded to the 2006 base reform by increasing
their average annual wage. The economic magnitude of the wage increase is rather sizable.
The wage increase amounts to around 4.7 percent in COEs and 1.3 percent in private rms,
and the size of the wage increase in COEs is signicantly larger than that in private rms.
Given that the average real wage per worker is around 14,534 RMB, this translates to an
increase of the annual wage in COEs of about 683 RMB, compared to a 188 RMB increase
in private rms. The value of the increase in the wage deduction is around 3,168 RMB per
year.27 Therefore, the increase in the average wage per worker translates to 22% of total tax
benets in COEs and 7% in private rms. Note that this is a lower bound of the tax benets
shared by workers because rstly, the deduction ceiling may not be binding for all workers,
and secondly, rms with losses are included in the regression. When we exclude loss-making
rms, the estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction terms COE  Post2006 increases slightly
to 0:064 and remains unchanged for private rms. Given that the average wage per worker
is 15,040 RMB for protable rms, the results suggest that the increase in the average wage
per worker amounts to 30% of total tax benets in protable COEs.28 Note also that the
27This is calculated as the increase in the annual wage deduction per worker (800 RMB 12) times the
statutory tax rate for domestic rms of 33%.
28The results remain almost unchanged when we exclude the small number of rms with an average wage
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identied wage response corresponds to the direct impact of the corporation tax, which equals
to a direct incidence of 30 cents in COEs, and 7 cents in private rms. The magnitude of this
e¤ect is slightly smaller than the wage incidence e¤ect of 49 cents found in Arulampalam,
Devereux and Ma¢ ni (2012) and of 46 cents found in Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch (2013).
These studies both consider the impact of tax rate changes.29 One potential explanation for
the di¤erence in results could be that the change in the cost deduction ceiling may be less
salient compared to changes in tax rates. Third, the wage increase in COEs is signicantly
larger than in private rms, suggesting that on average, workers in the COEs reaped a larger
share of benets brought by the 2006 policy reform. This result may reect that workers
in COEs are sometimes also partial owners of the company or that they might have greater
bargaining power than workers in private rms.
5.4 Heterogeneous Wage Responses
Table 4 presents some evidence on heterogenous wage responses to the 2006 increase in the
wage deduction threshold, which can be accounted for by di¤erences in the skill composition
of employment and the presence of labor unions. Specically, regressions in columns (1)-
(2) separately examines the wage response in low-skilland high-skillrms.30 Comparing
regression results in column (1) and (2), there are asymmetric wage responses across the
di¤erent ownership and labor skill types. In particular, the signicant wage increase after
the 2006 policy change mainly occurred in COEs and private rms with a large share of high-
skill workers. Such heterogenous wage responses by labor skill composition is consistent with
our theoretical discussion in Section 2, where we show that the tax e¤ect increases with the
number of high-skilled workers because for these workers the deduction ceiling is more likely
to be binding. In addition, high skilled workers may have more bargaining power.
To explore the role of trade unions, the regressions in column (3) and (4) separately
examine the wage response in rms with and without unions. The presence of a union
suggests a stronger bargaining power of the workers. Results in column (3) and (4) suggest
that the signicant wage increase after the 2006 policy change mainly occurred in COEs and
private rms with a trade union, which is again consistent with the prediction of result 1 in
per worker below the wage deduction ceiling.
29To be precise, Arulampalam, Devereux and Ma¢ ni (2012) consider changes in corporate tax payments
at the rm level, where tax rate changes play a key role, while Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch (2013) look at
statutory tax rate changes.
30A rm is dened as low skill if its share of low-skill workers is above the median share of low-skill
workers in the full sample, where the share of low-skill workers is dened as the number of workers without
any undergraduate education relative to the total number of workers in the rm. Since information on
the skill composition of workforce is only available for the year of 2004, the share of low-skill workers is
time-invariant and non-missing for those observed in 2004.
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the theoretical section. This result is interesting because Chinese unions are widely seen as
having little power and inuence.
6 Firm Responses to the 2008 Tax Reform
6.1 Empirical Approach
In this section, we analyze the e¤ect of the 2008 tax reform on two the other variables of
interest, the amount of debt nancing and investment. We do so using a similar D-in-D
approach:
yit = 0 + 1SOEi + 2SOEi  Post2008;t + 3COEi + 4COEi  Post2008;t (13)
+5privatei + 6privatei  Post2008;t + XXit + i + t + uit;
where yit represents the outcome variables and the Post2008;t dummy indicator takes value
of 1 from year 2008 onwards. Given that the 2008 tax reform introduced an immediate and
permanent decrease in the statutory tax rate of domestic rms from 33 to 25 percent but
had no immediate e¤ect on the statutory tax rate of foreign rms, we continue to use FIEs
as the control group in the D-in-D specication.
As previously discussed, we focus on two outcome variables that aim to capture the e¤ect
of taxes on debt nancing (proxied by debt-asset ratio) and investment (proxied by total
xed assets). Given that a reduction in the statutory tax rate increases the after-tax price
of borrowing, we expect that the 2008 tax reform would decrease the level of debt and hence
the leverage ratio in domestic rms. At the same time, a decrease in the statutory tax rate
reduces the cost of capital for domestic rms so that we expect an increase in the real capital
stock in these rms after the 2008 tax reform.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 The E¤ect of Tax Rate Changes on the Debt Ratio
Table 5 reports the regression results of the e¤ect of the 2008 tax reform on debt ratio.
Column (1) includes no additional control variables. Column (2) includes other determin-
ants of capital structure including rm size proxied by log of sales. Column (3) adds the
protability ratio to measure the availability of internal cash ow, and column (4) further
adds the sales growth rate to proxy future demand of nancing. Column (5) further controls
for di¤erential technology change at the industry level by including a full set of industry-
25
specic time trend.31 Column (6) checks the robustness of the ndings in column (5) to
potential anticipation e¤ects by removing observations in 2007 when the legislation change
was announced. Finally, column (7) includes the lagged debt ratio to control for persistence
in the dependent variable, while column (8) follows the same specication as in column (7)
but use a smaller sample with no companies switching ownership types.
The D-in-D approach appears to be valid given that there is no signicant response
in HMT debt nancing relative to other FIEs, which face similar tax changes brought by
the 2008 tax reform. Focusing on the estimated coe¢ cients of the interaction terms, there
are again di¤erential responses in the debt ratio across ownership types. While there is
no signicant change in the debt ratios of SOEs, both COEs and private rms responded
to the decrease in the tax rate by reducing their leverage. The estimated response of the
debt ratio to the tax change is highly signicant and robust to alternative specications.
The size of the tax e¤ect is slightly larger than ndings in An (2012a) where the average
debt-ratio increased by 0.003 in FIEs relative to their Chinese peers. His empirical approach
uses domestic rms as the control group and assumes that there is an immediate increase
in the statutory tax rate for FIEs but not in domestic rms.32 Our results suggest a strong
and positive link between corporate income tax rates and corporate debt levels. Using the
results from the preferred specication in column (7), cutting the corporate tax rate by eight
percentage points (e.g. from 33 to 25%), reduces the debt asset ratio on average by around
1.4% in COEs and by around 0.7% in private rms.33 This translates to an elasticity of debt
ratio with respect to the statutory tax rate of between 0.03 to 0.06, which is statistically
signicant and lies toward the lower end of the existing estimates of the impact of CIT on
corporate leverage in the literature.
It is interesting to note that on average, domestic rms rely more on debt than their
foreign-funded counterparts. In particular, SOEs have a higher debt ratio than rms of
any other ownership type. This could be due to the fact that SOEs have advantages over
non-SOEs in borrowing from banks at a lower cost (see, for example, Fang (2007), Lu et
al. (2009), and Pan et al. (2009)). Checking this in our data, we nd that SOEs have
the lowest interest rate among rms of all ve di¤erent ownership type. The interest rate
for domestic rms, which is calculated using interest expenses divided by total liability, is
31Potentially we would also like to control for non-debt corporate tax shields including depreciation al-
lowances and tax losses that are carried forward, which may reduce the value of the interest deduction.
Unfortunately, we do not have depreciation allowances for the year of 2008 and 2009 in the data.
32Contrary to An (2012a), we do not nd a larger tax e¤ect on the debt ratio for HMTs than for other
FIEs.
33de Mooij (2011) reviews this literature and derives consensus estimates using a meta-analysis based on
267 estimates from 19 di¤erent studies. The consensus estimate. regarding the impact of the CIT rate on the
debt-asset ratio, lies somewhere between 0.17 for narrow and 0.28 for broad measures of nancial leverage.
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about 0.012 for SOEs, and about 0.025/0.032 for COEs and private rms, respectively. The
interest rate for foreign-funded rms, is about 0.017 and 0.014 for HMT and other FIEs,
respectively. A formal t-test of equal group means suggests that the interest rate for SOEs
is signicantly lower than for other ownership types. The considerably lower interest rate
may well represent an implicit government subsidy to the SOEs as all major banks in China
are also owned by the state.
6.2.2 The E¤ect of Tax Rate Changes on Investment
Table 6 reports the regression results of the e¤ect of the 2008 tax reform on total xed assets.
Similarly, column (1) includes no additional control variables. Column (2) includes other
determinants of investment including the scale of production proxied by log of sales. Column
(3) adds the size of employment to control for any substitution between capital and labor,
and column (4) further adds the sales growth rate to proxy future demand of capital. Column
(5) further controls for di¤erential technology change at the industry level by including a
full set of industry-specic time trend.34 Column (6) checks the robustness of the ndings
in column (5) to any potential anticipation e¤ects by removing observations in 2007 when
the legislation change was announced. Column (7) includes lagged xed assets to control for
persistence in the dependent variable, and column (8) follows the same specication as in
column (7) but use a smaller sample with no companies switching ownership types.
The regression results suggest that the 2008 tax reform had some positive and signicant
e¤ects on total xed asset in private rms but not in SOEs or COEs. In other words, while
private rms continue to exhibit strong and positive response to the 2008 tax reform by
increasing their xed assets, there is no signicant response in COEs. There is a somewhat
puzzling e¤ect in SOEs, as the estimated tax e¤ect on xed assets is signicant and negative.
A further check on the validity of the parallel trends assumption in gure 4 suggests that,
the parallel trends assumption for total xed assets is largely satised for all the non-SOE
ownership types but is clearly violated for SOEs, as the xed asset in SOEs started to decline
as early as in 2005. The decreasing trend in total xed asset is not observed for any other
ownership.
Results in columns (7) and (8) suggest that on average, total xed assets in private
domestic rms increased by about 12.6 percent as a result of the 2008 tax reform. This
translates to an user cost elasticity of around 0.995, as the user cost of capital decreased
from 0.079 to 0.069, or around 12%, given the decrease in the statutory tax rate.35 The
34Potentially we would also like to control for non-debt corporate tax shields including depreciation al-
lowances and tax losses that are carried forward, which may reduce the value of the interest deduction.
Unfortunately, we do not have depreciation allowances for the year of 2008 and 2009 in the data.
35We thank Strahil Lepoev at the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation for providing estimates
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estimated user cost elasticity is signicantly di¤erent from zero but not di¤erent from -1 in
all columns, which is similar to ndings in Bond and Xing (2013).
Interestingly, results in column (5) suggest that total xed assets in HMT have also
signicantly decreased following the 2008 reform. This e¤ect becomes insignicant, however,
when including rm-level sales as an additional control. While the theory predicts no clear
e¤ect of taxes on total sales, a simple di¤erence-in-di¤erences regression suggests that total
sales in HMT has also decreased signicantly following the 2008 reform, while there is no
signicant decrease in sales to the tax reform in rms of all other ownership types. The
signicant decrease in investment as well as total sales in HMTs supports the view that
many Chinese investors engage in round-tripping investment by channelling capital to
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan rst. Investment by the HMT rms into Mainland China
is then disguised as foreign capital for local investment to take advantage of the preferential
tax treatments only available to foreign investors.36 Since the 2008 reform removed the
preferential tax rate for foreign investors one would expect that round trippinginvestment
and prot shifting becomes less attractive.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of the 2006 tax base reform and the 2008 tax rate reform
in China on di¤erent types of companies, with a focus on the comparison between private
and state-owned companies. We nd that the impact of the tax changes on private rms
and COEs is consistent with standard models of prot maximization and wage bargaining.
This also applies to foreign inward investment from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, where
the impact on investment we observe is consistent with the idea that Chinese investors use
HMT companies to benet from tax advantages for inward foreign investment. The impact
on SOEs is di¤erent. We do not observe a signicant increase in wages after the increase in
the deduction ceiling in 2006 and the reduction in the corporate tax rate has no signicant
e¤ect on the amount of debt nancing.
As far as SOEs are concerned our results are broadly consistent with the view put forward
by Huizinga and Nielsen (2001), according to which state owned companies do not perceive
taxes as costs and therefore have the advantage that their decisions are not distorted by taxes.
Of course, the nding that SOEs do not respond to tax reforms in the same way as private
of the user cost of capital in China. The calculation assumes an ination rate of 2.5%, a real interest rate
of 5%, and an economic depreciation rate of plant and machinery at 0.175. The present value of capital
allowance is calculated at a rate of 10% on a straight-line basis for plant and machinery.
36Xiao (2004) provides an in-depth discussion on the scale of round-tripping investment between Hong
Kong and mainland China.
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rms does not mean that they do perceive taxes as a substitute for prot distributions; their
decisions may be driven by entirely di¤erent considerations and more research is needed to
establish how they react to changes in taxes and other aspects of their economic environment.
At the same time our results suggest that COEs, which are also rms in a form of public
ownership, do not behave as suggested by Huizinga and Nielsen (2001). This may simply
reect that their owners - typically local governments - receive none or very little of the tax
revenue generated by these rms.
29
References
An, Zhiyong. 2012a. Taxation and Capital Structure: Empirical Evidence from a Quasi-
Experiment in China.Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(4): 683 689.
An, Zhiyong. 2012b. Taxation and foreign direct investment (FDI): empirical evidence
from a quasi-experiment in China. International Tax and Public Finance, 19(5): 660
676.
Appleton, Simon, Lina Song, and Qingjie Xia. 2005. Has China Crossed The River?
The Evolution of Wage Structure in Urban China during Reform and Retrenchment.
Journal of Comparative Economics, 33(4): 644  663. Symposium: Poverty and Labor
Markets in China.
Arulampalam, Wiji, Michael P. Devereux, and Giorgia Ma¢ ni. 2012. The Direct
Incidence of Corporate Income Tax on Wages.European Economic Review, 56(6): 1038
1054.
Auerbach, Alan J. 2002. Taxation and Corporate Financial Policy. In Handbook of
Public Economics. Vol. 3 of Handbook of Public Economics, , ed. A. J. Auerbach and M.
Feldstein, Chapter 19, 12511292. Elsevier.
Bai, Chong-En, Jiangyong Lu, and Zhigang Tao. 2006. TheMultitask Theory of State
Enterprise Reform: Empirical Evidence from China.The American Economic Review,
96(2): pp. 353357.
Bond, Stephen, and Jing Xing. 2013. Corporate Taxation and Capital Accumulation.
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 1015.
Bradford, David F. 1978. Factor prices may be constant but factor returns are not.
Economics Letters, 1(3): 199203.
Bradshaw, Mark T., Guanmin Liao, and Mark(Shuai) Ma. 2012. State Ownership,
Tax and Manager Promotion: Evidence from China.American Accounting Association
Annual Meeting Conference Paper.
Brandt, Loren, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, and Yifan Zhang. 2012. Creative Ac-
counting or Creative Destruction? Firm-level Productivity Growth in Chinese Manufac-
turing.Journal of Development Economics, 97(2): 339 351.
30
Caballero, Ricardo J., Eduardo M. R. A. Engel, and John C. Haltiwanger. 1995.
Plant-Level Adjustment and Aggregate Investment Dynamics.Brookings Papers on Eco-
nomic Activity, 26(2): 154.
Cao, Yuanzheng, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast. 1999. From Federalism,
Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style.Economics of Transition, 7(1): 103131.
Chen, Donghua, Dequan Jiang, Alexander Ljungqvist, Haitian Lu, and Ming-
ming Zhou. 2015. State Capitalism vs. Private Enterprise.National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research Working Paper 20930.
Chirinko, Robert S., Steven M. Fazzari, and Andrew P. Meyer. 1999. How Re-
sponsive is Business Capital Formation to Its User Cost?: An Exploration with Micro
Data.Journal of Public Economics, 74(1): 5380.
Clausing, Kimberly A. 2009. Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and Tax Policy.Na-
tional Tax Journal, 62(4): 70325.
Clausing, Kimberly A. 2013. Who Pays The Corporate Tax In A Global Economy?
National Tax Journal, 66(1): 15184.
Cui, Wei. 2012. Taxing State-Owned Enterprises: Towards an Understanding of a Basic
Institution of State Capitalism.China University of Political Science and Law Unpub-
lished Manuscript.
Cummins, Jason G., Kevin A. Hassett, R. Glenn Hubbard, Robert E. Hall, and
Ricardo J. Caballero. 1994. A Reconsideration of Investment Behavior Using Tax
Reforms as Natural Experiments.Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1994(2): pp.
174.
Davidson, Carl, and Lawrence W Martin. 1985. General Equilibrium Tax Incidence
under Imperfect Competition: A Quantity-setting Supergame Analysis.Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 93(6): 121223.
de Mooij, Ruud A. 2011. The Tax Elasticity of Corporate Debt; A Synthesis of Size and
Variations.International Monetary Fund IMF Working Papers 11/95.
Diamond, Peter A, and James A Mirrlees. 1971. Optimal Taxation and Public Pro-
duction II: Tax Rules.American Economic Review, 61(3): 26178.
Diamond, Peter, and Johannes Spinnewijn. 2011. Capital Income Taxes with Het-
erogeneous Discount Rates.American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3(4): 5276.
31
Dwenger, Nadja, Pia Rattenhuber, and Viktor Steiner. 2013. Sharing the Burden?
Empirical Evidence on Corporate Tax Incidence.German Economic Association Annual
Conference 2013: Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80040.
Edgerton, Jesse. 2010. Investment Incentives and Corporate Tax Asymmetries.Journal
of Public Economics, 94(11): 936 952.
Felix, R. Alison, and Jr. James R. Hines. 2009. Corporate Taxes and Union Wages
in the United States.National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 15263.
Fuest, Clemens, Andreas Peichl, and Sebastian Siegloch. 2013. Do Higher Corporate
Taxes Reduce Wages? Micro Evidence from Germany.CESifo Group Munich CESifo
Working Paper Series 4247.
Gordon, Roger H. 2010. Taxation And Corporate Use Of Debt: Implications For Tax
Policy.National Tax Journal, 63(1): 15174.
Gordon, Roger H., and David D. Li. 1999. The e¤ects of wage distortions on the
transition:: Theory and evidence from China.European Economic Review, 43(1): 163 
183.
Graham, John R. 2003. Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review.Review of Financial
Studies, 16(4): 10751129.
Harberger, Arnold C. 1995. The ABCs of Corporation Tax Incidence: Insights into the
Open-Economy Case.In . Washington D.C.: American Council for Capital Formation.
Harrold, Peter, and Rajiv Lall. 1993. China, Reform and Development in 1992-93.
Washington, D.C.: World Bank World Bank Discussions Paper 215.
Heckemeyer, Jost H., and Michael Overesch. 2013. MultinationalsProt Response
to Tax Di¤erentials: E¤ect Size and Shifting Channels.
Huizinga, Harry, and Søren Bo Nielsen. 2001. Privatization, public investment, and
capital income taxation.Journal of Public Economics, 82(3): 399 414.
Jorgenson, Dale W. 1963. Capital Theory and Investment Behavior.American Eco-
nomic Review, 53(2): 247259.
Lardy, Nicholas R. 1995. The Role of Foreign Trade and Investment in Chinas Economic
Transformation.The China Quarterly, 144: 10651082.
32
Li, David D. 1998. Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy. The American
Economic Review, 88(2): pp. 393397.
Liu, Li, and Rosanne Altshuler. 2013. Measuring The Burden Of The Corporate Income
Tax Under Imperfect Competition.National Tax Journal, 66(1): 21537.
Lu, Jiangyong, and Zhigang Tao. 2009. Trends and Determinants of Chinas Industrial
Agglomeration.Journal of Urban Economics, 65(2): 167 180.
Megginson, William L., and Je¤ry M. Netter. 2001. From State to Market: A Survey
of Empirical Studies on Privatization.Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2): pp. 321
389.
National Bureau of Statistics. 2013. China Statistical Yearbook 2013. China Statistics
Press.
Shoven, John B. 1976. The Incidence and E¢ ciency E¤ects of Taxes on Income from
Capital.Journal of Political Economy, 84(6): pp. 12611283.
Wang, Xiao, and Richard Herd. 2013. The System of Revenue Sharing and Fiscal
Transfers in China.OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 1030.
World Bank. 2002. Box 2.3: Round-tripping of capital ows between China and Hong
Kong.Global Development Finance, 41.
Xiao, Geng. 2004. Peoples Republic of Chinas Round-Tripping FDI: Scale, Causes and
Implications.Asian Development Bank Discussion Paper 7.
Xia, Qingjie, Lina Song, Shi Li, and Simon Appleton. 2013. The E¤ects of the State
Sector on Wage Inequality in Urban China: 1988-2007.Institute for the Study of Labor
(IZA) IZA Discussion Papers 7142.
Yagan, Danny. 2013. Capital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: the E¤ects of the 2003
Dividend Tax Cut.Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 1322.
Zwick, Eric, and James Mahon. 2014. Do Financial Frictions Amplify Fiscal Policy?
Evidence from Business Investment Stimulus.Oxford University Centre for Business Tax-
ation Working Paper 1415.
33
Figure 1. Sample Description by Ownership Type
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Notes: The gure shows the evolution of key rm characteristics by ownership type during 2003-
2009. All monetary terms are expressed in 2006 values.
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Figure 2. Protability and Average Tax Rate by Ownership
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gure shows the average protability and e¤ective average tax rate across the di¤erent
ownership types during 2003-2009. Ratios of protability and average tax rates are winsorized at
top and bottom 0.05 percentile.
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Figure 3. Average Wage Bill per Worker
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Notes: This gure shows the average annual real wage per worker (in log) across the dif-
ferent types of ownership during 2003-2007. The vertical dash line depicts the reform year
when the wage deduction threshold was increased from 800 RMB (£ 80 approximately) to
1,600 RMB (£ 160 approximately) per worker-month for domestic rms including SOEs,
COEs, and private rms.
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Figure 4. Debt Ratio and Fixed Assets around the 2008 Tax Reform
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Figure A.1. Corporate Income Taxes: China v.s. UK
(a) CIT as a Share of Total Tax Revenue (%)
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